This article identifies tax policy that both speeds recovery from the current economic crisis and contributes to long-run growth. This is a challenge because short-term recovery requires increases in demand while long-term growth requires increases in supply. As short-term tax concessions can be hard to reverse, this implies that policies to alleviate the crisis could compromise long-run growth. The analysis makes use of recent evidence on the impact of tax structure on economic growth to identify which growth-enhancing tax changes can also aid recovery, taking account of the need to protect those on low incomes.
1
The analysis focuses on tax structures (such as the tax mix or the rates and bases of individual taxes) rather than levels (as measured, for example, by the overall taxto-GDP ratio) because cross-country differences in tax levels largely reflect societal choices as to the appropriate level of public spending, an issue that is beyond the scope of tax policy analysis. In addition, the focus on tax structures allows a consideration of revenue-neutral tax policy changes, and thus avoids the difficulty of taking account of how any changes in aggregate revenue might be reflected in changes in public expenditure. The importance of this second point can be seen by comparing (i) a tax revenue increase that finances increased infrastructure investment with (ii) a similar increase to finance increased social benefits.
The empirical work of Bleaney et al. (2001) suggests that policy (i) can be expected to have a better growth outcome than policy (ii), 2 and therefore neither policy could be said to represent the effect of tax revenue on economic growth.
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of tax policy on levels and on growth rates of GDP. This is because transitional growth may be long-lasting and so it has not proved possible to distinguish effects on long-run growth from transitional growth effects, although some elements of the tax system are likely to influence long-run growth. For instance, it is possible that tax changes that encourage innovation and entrepreneurship may have persistent long-run growth effects, while those that affect investment also can have long-lasting effects on growth that fade out in the long run. In contrast, tax changes affecting labour supply are likely to have only a transitory effect on growth.
There is a considerable literature on the effects of tax structures on efficiency and income distribution, including optimal tax design, the policy implications of which are discussed in Institute for Fiscal Studies (2010) . However, a relatively small amount of this literature is concerned with the impact of tax on economic growth and has mainly been concerned with the balance between the taxation of labour income, capital income and expenditure. For example, Lucas (1990) provides a very clear exposition of the view that capital income should not be taxed, at least in the long run, because such taxation reduces investment and, therefore, growth. He illustrates this theoretical conclusion with a simulation for the US which suggests that eliminating capital income taxation would increase long-run consumption by about 7%, although the welfare gain would be much smaller than suggested by this steady-state figure because of the fall in consumption that would occur during the transition to a higher capital stock. Interestingly, the simulated effect on the steady-state growth of the economy is very small, about 0.03 of a percentage point, thus illustrating the point that higher rates of transitional growth are no indication of substantial changes in long-run growth.
Lucas's article stimulated a range of responses, including Laitner (1995) whose simulations suggests a higher welfare gain and Grü ner and Heer (2000) who argue that the desirability of zero taxation of capital income is sensitive to the assumptions made in the model. 3 There is also an empirical literature in which Stokey and Rebello (1995) and Mendoza et al. (1997) suggest that tax policy has little effect on long-run growth, while Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001) argue that the mix between income taxes and consumption taxes has a definite effect on long-run growth.
In this context, the empirical work in this article makes two contributions to the understanding of the effect of taxes on growth in the short and medium run:
It uses a panel of 21 OECD countries over 34 years to estimate the effect of tax structure on growth in more detail than earlier work. It complements this macroeconomic approach with a closer look at the underlying micro mechanisms, by using both industry and individual firm data. At these lower levels of aggregation, this article estimates the effects of tax structure on investment and productivity growth: two of the main drivers of economic growth.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 1 reports on the effects of changes in the tax mix between major categories of taxes at the macroeconomic level. Section 2 contains the industry-level and firm-level analysis of the effect of taxes on productivity and investment. Section 3 examines the tax policy implications of these results, together with findings related to more detailed aspects of the tax system. Section 4 uses these findings to examine the effects of various tax policy changes on both economic recovery and growth. Section 5 briefly considers the impact of these tax policies on inequality. Section 6 looks at the question of how taxes should change after economic recovery. Finally, Section 7 summarises the conclusions of the analysis.
The Overall Tax Mix
In order to analyse the effect of the tax mix in detail and over as long a period as possible, estimates at the macro level were obtained by introducing a set of tax structure indicators into panel regressions of GDP per capita, using annual data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1971 to 2004 in an error-correction setup. Basic explanatory variables besides the tax indicators include measures of physical and human capital accumulation, population growth and fixed effects for time and countries. The estimations use a Pooled Mean Group estimator following Pesaran et al. (1999) , which allows a selective treatment of variables -and of the speed of adjustment into equilibrium -with respect to whether its coefficient should be constrained to equality across all countries or left country-specific. Constraining coefficients represents a considerable efficiency gain but may not be an appropriate assumption in all cases. 4 In practice, this choice can be guided by using simple Hausman tests (Hausman, 1978) . The variable-by-variable results of these tests suggest that imposing cross-country homogeneity for the long-run relationships between tax structures and GDP is acceptable in our sample of OECD countries, whereas different economies display substantial heterogeneity with respect to how they adjust in the short-run. As a result, the macro estimation allows both the short-run coefficients and the speed of adjustment to vary across countries. 5 The estimated equation has the form:
where y is GDP per capita, s k is the investment rate into physical capital, h is human capital measured in average years of schooling of the working age population, n is population growth, V j are a set of policy variables including the tax indicators and e it is an error term. Additional details on the derivation of the estimated equation and the data are provided in the Appendix.
The setup also takes into account the fact that more use of a given tax instrument reduces the amount of revenues that need to be raised from other taxes, when considering revenue-neutral tax changes. This is achieved by always omitting one element of the tax mix in each regression (indicated in the bottom line of Table 1 ) and this component is assumed to be absorbing changes in the other taxes that are included in the regression, to maintain revenue neutrality. The tax structure indicators are defined as the share of tax revenue that is raised from a given tax in total tax revenue.
The interpretation of the results needs to take account of three important aspects of the estimation procedure. First, the estimated equations control for unobserved timeinvariant heterogeneity through country fixed effects. 6 Hence, the focus is on changes in the variables, examining how each country's GDP changes when its tax shares change. This has the added advantage of capturing the effect that is of interest to policy makers: how will GDP respond if they change the tax mix? Second, as the estimates are based on the changes in the tax mix that have been observed in OECD countries, they show the effects of fairly modest changes in the tax mix and do not necessarily apply to more substantial changes. Finally, given the estimation equation, the results must be interpreted as effects on the long-run level of GDP, even though the estimation equation can be derived from both exogenous and endogenous growth models.
7 Table 1 reports the long-run effects of various revenue-neutral tax shifts, based on the estimated dynamic equation, which also includes measures of the accumulation of physical and human capital and population growth as basic growth determinants as well as the overall tax burden as a control variable.
8 Column 1 shows a negative coefficient on the share of (personal and corporate) income taxes in total tax revenues, indicating that an increase in the share of these taxes that is balanced by an decreased share of consumption and property taxes will reduce long-run GDP per capita and thus reduce growth. Column 2 looks at the different effects of personal and corporate taxes and shows that an increase in corporate income taxes (financed by an increase in consumption and property taxes) has a stronger negative effect on GDP per capita than a similar increase in personal income taxation.
Columns 3 to 5 report on a shift in the opposite direction: increasing consumption and property taxes while reducing income taxes. Column 3 shows a positive effect that is similarly-sized to the negative effect reported in column 1. Results reported in column 4 break up the effect of an increase in consumption and property taxes, allowing a reduction in income taxation. While both of them are associated with higher GDP per capita than relying on income taxes, the effect is significantly larger for property taxes. Column 5 separates recurrent taxes on immovable property from all other property taxes and the positive effect on GDP is significantly larger for recurrent taxes on immovable property than for all other property taxes and consumption taxes. Further analysis (not reported in Table 1 ) of the countries that separate data for recurrent taxes on immovable property into those levied on households and those levied on corporations suggests that taxes levied on households have the least adverse effect on GDP per capita. However, it should be noted that this result is based on about half the number of countries represented in the results reported in Table 1 .
In interpreting these results, it is important to bear in mind the inherent limitations of this kind of econometric analysis, which are shared by other studies on this topic. For example, even though a number of additional policy variables such as inflation, inflation volatility, trade openness and expenditures on research and development have been included as additional variables in robustness checks and have not affected the basic findings regarding taxes, 9 it has not been possible to control for all other policy variables that might have influenced the evolution of GDP. In addition, tax policies are sometimes changed in response to economic developments and cannot be 
Income taxes
Notes. * Significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.
y All equations include short-run dynamics, country-specific intercepts and country-specific time controls. Standard errors are in brackets.
regarded as completely exogenous. Probably the most prominent variable to which tax policies may have reacted in the past is the business cycle. Robustness checks have been undertaken in which the tax indicators have been purged of all correlations with the output gap and instrumented using lagged values, without affecting the empirical findings.
10 Another empirical issue that may affect empirical studies of growthalthough it has not been accounted for in large parts of the applied empirical literature -is cross-sectional dependence (Durlauf et al., 2005; Eberhardt and Teal, 2010) . While the dynamic nature of our empirical model and the non-stationary data rule out the use of several empirical methods typically employed to control for cross-section dependence (e.g., Driscoll and Kraay, 1995; Pesaran, 2006) , robustness checks based on a feasible general least squares estimator (FGLS) suggested by Kmenta (1986) , which is consistent even in the presence of cross-section dependence, show that the coefficients on the tax structure variables remain statistically significant (and keep their signs) although they are substantially reduced in magnitude, perhaps partly because the FGLS estimator does not allow the same flexibility in short-run dynamics that is allowed in the results presented in Table 1 . This provides confirmation that tax structure does affect the evolution of GDP but establishing the magnitude of these affect requires additional work.
11
Subject to these qualifications, the results suggest a 'tax and growth ranking' with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the least harmful (or most beneficial) tax instrument in terms of its effect on long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. An idea of the possible magnitude of these differences is given by the estimates of the effect on GDP per capita of a shift of 1% of tax revenues from income taxes to consumption and property taxes, based on the estimates presented in Table 1 . These suggest that such a revenue-neutral shift would increase GDP per capita by between 0.25% and 1% in the long run, depending on the empirical specification.
Tax Effects on Productivity and Investment
The results obtained at the aggregate level suggest that corporate and personal income taxes are particularly harmful for growth. In order to check on the validity of this possible harmful effect, and to get a better understanding of the channels through which it may be operating, this Section tries to look beyond macroeconomic aggregates. Using annual data at both the firm level and the industry level, this Section aims to shed some light on the empirical link between these taxes and total factor productivity (TFP) and investment.
12
The empirical evidence at industry level is based on a panel data set of 21 industries in manufacturing and business services across 13 OECD countries over the period , extracted from the OECD STAN database. TFP is calculated using a superlative index number approach following Caves et al. (1982a, b) , which makes it 10 See the working paper version of this research (Arnold, 2008) for these robustness checks (especially Table 5 in that article).
11 These results are available from the authors upon request. 12 Additional details of the industry-and firm-level analysis and data are provided in the working papers on which this Section draws, Schwellnus and Arnold (2008) and Vartia (2008) .
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13
The analysis at the firm level is based on a stratified sample of approximately 287,000 firms from 12 European OECD countries over the years 1996 to 2004, extracted from the Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk) database. Stratification was undertaken to match the distribution of the sample to the true population across industries and size classes, to ensure the representativeness of the firm-level data for each country. Firm-level estimates of TFP have been obtained by estimating country-industry-specific production functions, using a value-added specification with capital and labour as production inputs.
14 Investment data are obtained as the first difference of capital stocks adjusted for depreciation.
Productivity
In the analysis of productivity at the industry and firm levels, we follow the empirical approach suggested by Griffith et al. (2004 Griffith et al. ( , 2009 , who model TFP growth as a function of TFP growth at the technological frontier and the distance of a given firm (or industry) to the frontier, in the spirit of Aghion and Howitt (1998) . Our basic estimation equation has the form
where subscripts i, c, s, t stand for firm, country, industry and time, respectively, A icts is the TFP of a given firm i, A Fcst is the TFP level at the technological frontier, x is a vector of explanatory variables including tax structure indicators and d is a vector of fixed effects at the industry level and at the level of country-year combinations. TFP levels at the technological frontier are constructed as the average of the 5% most productive firms in country c, industry s and year t in the firm-level analysis, while it is the highest TFP level in industry s and year t across countries in the industry level analysis, where the firm subscript i is obviously not relevant. This implies that the first regressor and the denominator of the second regressor have no country subscript in the industry level equation.
The identification of the effect of taxes relies on the insight of Rajan and Zingales (1998) that variation across industries within the same country can be applied to analyse the effects of a country-specific variable. Their difference-in-differences approach applies directly to the present context. When analysing the effect of corporate taxes, our identifying assumption is that the production technology in an industry determines average profitability of firms, which in turn determine the relative 13 Nominal values are deflated using industry-specific price indices from the EUKLEMS database, with the exception of capital stocks that are deflated using deflators for gross fixed capital formation from the OECD Economic Outlook database. Additional covariates used in the analysis are described in Vartia (2008) .
14 Nominal values are deflated as in the industry-level analysis. While the baseline specifications are based on productivity estimates obtained using OLS, additional robustness checks based on semi-parametric Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimate of the production function and a superlative index measure following Caves et al. (1982a,b) , which is also applied in Griffith et al. (2004 Griffith et al. ( , 2009 , confirm the findings. size of the tax base for corporate taxation. 15 The statutory corporate tax rate hence enters the model interacted with the relative profitability in industry s compared to the industry average, calculated on the basis of US data. 16 The rationale is that as corporate taxes reduce the after-tax return of a TFP-enhancing investment, that negative effect is expected to be stronger in industries in which the tax base of corporate taxation, namely enterprise profits, is larger. When analysing the effect of the top personal income tax rate in the industry-level analysis, the interaction factor is an industryspecific measure of entrepreneurial activity, proxied by the rate of firm entry in the US, obtained from Haltiwanger et al. (2006) . The rationale here is that if income taxation reduces the incentives for entrepreneurial activity, this effect should be more visible in industries with a naturally higher rate of new firm entry, due to the production technology of the industry. As we control for both unobserved industry-specific effects and unobserved country-year fixed effects, the constituent terms do not enter the estimating equation separately in either case. One important caveat to this approach is that the size of the estimated effect only reflects the differential effect of a tax across industries. Any direct effect of the tax on TFP (unrelated to the industry characteristics) is soaked up in the fixed effects.
If the results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that taxes have a negative impact on TFP, then the estimated coefficient of the interaction term should be negative. Table 2 summarises the main empirical results concerning the influence of taxes on TFP at both the firm-level and the industry-level. The firm-level results are shown in the first two columns. Column 1 shows that higher statutory corporate tax rates are estimated to reduce firm-level TFP. Column 2 shows that this negative effect of corporate taxes is similar across firms of different size and age classes, except for firms that are both small and young (where the effect is smaller and statistically insignificant). This may be due to some countries' exemptions or reduced rates targeted at startup firms, which would reduce the amount of their corporate tax payments. Column 3 reports the main empirical result obtained at the industry-level, again using the main statutory corporate tax rate as the measure of corporate taxation. This confirms that lowering corporate taxes is estimated to boost TFP.
An alternative to using the main statutory corporate tax rate in the estimation of the effect of corporate taxes on TFP would have been to use effective corporate tax rates. To test the difference that this would make, empirical analysis was undertaken using data on the effective tax rates computed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) based on the methodology of Devereux and Griffith (2003) . The empirical results (Vartia, 2008 ) on a panel of 12 OECD countries covering 21 industries over the 1981-2001 periods suggest that the average effective corporate tax (AETR) has a negative effect on TFP, thus confirming our previous finding on the link between corporate taxation and productivity. 15 Observed differences in accounting profits across industries are likely to reflect differences in technological conditions. For example, an industry that is intensive in high-risk investments involving research and development such as the pharmaceutical industry may need to generate higher accounting profits as a reward for large investment outlays in the past. As taxes are levied on accounting profits, the tax base in relatively profitable industries is larger than in industries with low profitability. 16 Similarly to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and to minimise concerns about endogeneity of this variable, we derive these differences from data from the US (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1997), a large and competitive economy that is not part of our estimation sample.
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Column 4 reports the effects of top marginal income tax rates on TFP, based on the assumption that any effect will be stronger in industries with a high rate of new firm entry. This is assumed partly because new firms may be more risky and partly because new firms may be more likely to be either unincorporated or closely held corporations, and so more likely to take account of the personal tax treatment of profits than is a publicly traded corporation. The results support this supposition by showing that top marginal personal income tax rates have a more negative effect on TFP in industries characterised by high firm entry rates. Notes. * Denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. In the industry analysis TFP is based on an index approach, while in the firm-level analysis it is estimated as residuals from industry-specific production functions (Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; Vartia, 2008) . Anti-competitive regulation is measured using the timevarying indicators of anti-competitive regulation (anti-competitive regulation impact) across industries developed by Conway and Nicoletti (2006) , with higher values indicating more stringent regulation. Human capital is an industry-level proxy of human capital based on data about wages at different skill levels, as well as the respective input usage of labour at different skill levels at the industry level (Vartia, 2008) . Robust standard errors corrected for clustering are reported in parentheses.
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Investment
The empirical results obtained at the firm level to assess the effect of taxes on investment were obtained by augmenting a standard investment equation with a industryspecific measure of the tax-adjusted user cost. 17 Asset-specific measures of the user cost of capital were calculated on the basis of an asset's required rate of return, the economic rate of depreciation, anticipated capital gains ⁄ losses due to a change in its before-tax price and, additionally, an adjustment for corporate taxes and depreciation allowances according to the following formula:
where a denotes an asset and p a ⁄ p, q, d and E(Dp a ⁄ p a ) the asset price of relative to the output price, the required rate of return, the rate of economic depreciation and the expected change in the asset price, respectively. s and Z denote the corporate tax rate and the present value of depreciation allowances. The industry-specific user cost used in the analysis is constructed as a weighted average of the asset-specific user cost where the weights are the share of each asset in total industry investment.
18
The estimated equation follows the approach of Becker and Sivadasan (2010) who derive the following estimating equation from an Euler equation:
where I denotes gross investment, K last year's capital stock, CF cash flow, UC the tax adjusted user cost of capital, the vector d includes fixed effects for industries and countryyear combinations, and e icst a random error term. The lagged dependent variable and its square capture the dynamics of the investment process. With quadratic adjustment costs, as in Becker and Sivadasan (2010) , it is expected that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and the coefficient on its square is negative. The cash flow ratio captures the effect of financial market imperfections. It is expected that credit constrained firms' investment increases with their access to internal funds. The user cost of capital combines the real cost of debt and equity financing, the economic rate of depreciation, real capital gains and losses and an adjustment for taxes into a single measure and is expected to reduce investment. The results are reported in Table 3 . Column 1 of Table 3 suggests that increases in the tax-adjusted user cost of capital are found to reduce investment at the firm level, while column 2 suggests that this effect is larger for more profitable firms. A simulation experiment suggests that a reduction of the statutory corporate tax rate from 35 to 30% reduces the user cost by approximately 2.8%. Applying the estimated long-run tax adjusted user cost elasticity (from column 1), this implies a long-run increase of the investment-to-capital ratio of approximately 1.9%. Note that this elasticity has been calculated at the mean value of 17 The underlying user cost of capital formula is based on the pioneering work by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) .
18 Data on asset shares are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Asset and output prices, rates of return, economic depreciation are extracted from the OECD Productivity Database and data on the tax adjustment are obtained from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS).
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[ F E B R U A R Y the user cost and investment-to-capital ratio by applying the formula r ¼ b 4 =½1 À b 1 À 2b 2 ðI =K Þ Â ðUC=I =K Þ, where upper bars indicate sample means. Column 3 shows that the size of the negative tax effect on investment appears to be similar for small and large firms (measured by the number of employees). In contrast, older firms' investment appears to be more negatively affected by increases in the taxadjusted user cost than young firms, to the extent that it is only the effect on older firms that is statistically significant. One possible explanation is that young firms are generally less profitable than older firms and therefore less affected by corporate taxation. The other explanation may be that among young firms there is a disproportionately high share of small firms that benefit from exemptions or reduced rates.
Additional results on investment, obtained at the industry level, are reported in Vartia (2008) . Investment is clearly negatively affected by increases in corporate taxation but the long-run user cost elasticity is estimated to vary between À0.4 and À1, depending on the empirical specification. A simulation experiment indicates that a cut in the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 30% would increase the long-run Notes. * Denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The estimation sample contains 12 European OECD countries and only observations with investment ratios between 0 and 1. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the country-industry level in parentheses.
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investment-to-capital ratio by 1.0% or 2.6%, depending on the specification. These two estimates at the industry level lie on either side of the firm-level estimate.
Tax Policy Implications
The estimates presented in Sections 1 and 2 can be seen as suggesting an approximate average effect for the countries whose data are included. This means that they cannot be used directly to predict what will happen in any particular country. The tax policy changes that are most likely to increase growth in any country will depend on its starting point, in terms of both its current tax system and the areas (such as employment, investment or productivity growth) in which its current economic performance is relatively poor. In addition, the estimates are based on the relatively small tax policy changes that most OECD countries have undertaken and cannot be used to estimate the impact of larger changes. Nonetheless, the estimates do provide a basis for the serious consideration of a number of directions for tax reform. In examining these directions, governments will need to take account of other factors apart from the growth of GDP. Issues of revenue sufficiency, equity, simplicity and compliance costs are just some examples of the factors that are often considered. Thus, the suggestion that reducing corporate taxes can increase the level and, possibly, the rate of growth of GDP is not sufficient on its own to recommend the policy.
The results presented in Section 1 suggest a 'tax and growth ranking' with recurrent taxes on immovable property being the preferred tax instrument in terms of long-run GDP per capita, followed by consumption taxes (and other property taxes), personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. This ranking is consistent with earlier empirical results (e.g., Kneller et al., 1999) and is readily explained in theoretical terms. The growth effects of each type of tax are considered in turn below; see Johansson et al. (2008) for a more detailed discussion.
Recurrent taxes on immovable property (especially residential property) are relatively good for growth because most OECD countries provide various tax preferences for owner-occupied housing (such as tax deductibility of interest on house loans and exemption from capital gains tax), which result in a misallocation of capital towards housing, away from other investments. In this situation, the pre-tax rate of return on housing investment is below the pre-tax rate of return on investment elsewhere in the economy. This implies that increasing recurrent taxes on immovable property will shift some investment out of housing into higher return investments and so increase the rate of growth. Taxes on property transactions -another major form of property tax -also have the benefit of shifting investment out of housing into higher-return activities. However, they have the disadvantage of discouraging housing transactions and thus the reallocation of housing to its most productive use, thus reducing growth. They also raise the cost of moving and in this way may lower labour mobility. Other property taxes -on financial transactions, inheritance and net wealth -can also distort the allocation of capital and ⁄ or the incentive to save. Thus, property taxes in general are likely to be more harmful to growth than recurrent taxes on immovable property.
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Consumption taxes increase the prices of consumer goods and so reduce the real reward for working, and therefore can affect labour supply. However, they do not discourage saving and investment provided that they are expected to be constant over time. Also, they are normally applied on a destination basisapplied to imports and refunded ⁄ exempted on export -and so do not affect the behaviour of firms that produce internationally traded goods. They can distort the behaviour of firms producing non-traded goods if applied at non-uniform rates but the spread of general consumption taxes, such as VAT, means that consumption taxes are more uniform now than they used to be in most OECD countries, although reduced VAT rates are still common. Thus, consumption taxes can be expected to have little negative effect on growth, although they do not have the advantages of recurrent taxes on immovable property. Personal income taxes are seen as more harmful to growth than consumption taxes for three reasons. First, they are generally progressive, with marginal tax rates (which discourage growth) that are higher than their average rates (which generate government revenues). This means that they discourage growth more per unit of tax revenue than consumption taxes, which are generally flat rate and not (or not very) progressive. Second, they typically tax the return to savings (interest or dividends) in addition to taxing the income from which savings are made, thus discouraging savings. While this second effect may not harm the growth of publicly quoted companies that can raise funds overseas, it may reduce the growth financing for small and medium-sized companies (especially those that rely on the funds of family and friends). Third, high income tax and social security contributions on low-wage workers can lead to people choosing to stay on social benefits rather than work (Brewer et al., 2010) . Corporate income taxes can be expected to be the most harmful for growth as they discourage the activities of firms that are most important for growth: investment in capital and in productivity improvements. The possible negative effects on both investment and productivity growth in OECD countries are indicated in Section 2. Finally, Hajkova et al. (2006) show that they can reduce foreign direct investment. In addition, most corporate tax system have a large number of provisions that create tax advantages for specific activities, typically drawing resources away from the industries in which they can make the greatest contribution to growth.
This 'tax and growth ranking' implies that growth may be increased, at least temporarily, without reducing tax revenue by a partial shift from income taxes to consumption and property taxes. Taxes on residential property are likely to be best for growth. However, few countries manage to raise substantial revenues from property taxes, with housing generally taxed more lightly than other assets. In practical policy terms, therefore, a greater revenue shift could probably be achieved into consumption taxes.
While recurrent taxes on immovable property appear to be the best taxes to increase -from a growth point of view -corporate taxes appear to be the taxes that should be reduced most. However, lowering the corporate tax rate substantially below the top personal income tax rate can jeopardise the integrity of the tax system as high-income 2011 ] F71 individuals will attempt to shelter their savings within corporations. This means that it often makes sense to think about reducing income taxes in a co-ordinated way. Of course, changing the balance between different tax sources should not been seen as the only way in which tax structure can influence economic growth. Improving the design of individual taxes may also be important. The OECD study suggests that the following changes are likely to promote long-term growth:
The levying of the main consumption tax (VAT in most countries) at a single rate with as few exemptions as possible to minimise distortions and ease administration and compliance, while levying additional specific consumption taxes in cases where they can reduce environmental damage, discourage unhealthy consumption or encourage labour supply. The reduction of income taxes and social security contributions on low-wage workers in countries where these workers have inadequate incentives to work (because of the combined effects of the tax and benefit systems). The reduction of employer social security contributions on low-wage workers, particularly in countries with a high minimum wage. The reduction of the top personal income tax rate, in order to encourage entrepreneurship and investment in education. The negative effect of high top personal income tax rates on productivity growth, through their effect on entrepreneurship, is shown in Section 2.
Economic Recovery and Growth
In considering which of the tax policies suggested at the end of the previous Section by a concern for growth would be likely to help speed the economic recovery, it is necessary to ask whether they would increase expenditure -on either investment or consumption -in the short-term. One important general consideration is how quickly the tax cuts can benefit the taxpayers; there is little point in cutting a tax rate now that will only reduce tax payments next year.
While cutting corporate tax is good for long-run growth, it is unlikely that cutting corporate tax rates will quickly increase investment. Cuts in the rate may well be ineffective when businesses are making little or no profit, especially if it is expected that the rate will be increased by the time the investment starts yielding a profit. In addition, businesses are more likely to increase investment in response to sustained increases in demand and improved credit availability than a temporary tax cut. However, if corporate taxes are chosen as part of the tax cuts, it would be more effective to provide investment tax credits, especially if they are payable to firms in a loss position or can be carried forward to when the business regains profitability.
Cuts in the top personal income tax rate are also good for growth but, as with corporate taxes, temporary cuts are unlikely to increase demand a great deal, at least for those on higher incomes who are not credit-constrained. The arguments here are essentially the same as that used by Crossley et al. (2009) in their analysis of the income effect of a temporary VAT cut: consumers have a long planning horizon and a temporary tax cut will have a small effect on their permanent income; there is a possibility of partial Ricardian equivalence as households realise that the tax cuts will have to be
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[ F E B R U A R Y balanced by future tax increases, especially in countries with large public debts. This indicates that, as with corporate tax cuts, there is a conflict between the wish to increase expenditure in the short-run and the wish to promote growth in the longer-run. In contrast, cutting personal income taxes for credit-constrained low-income households can be expected to be relatively effective as such households are likely to spend more of any tax cut than high-income families (Crossley et al., 2009) , even if the cut is only temporary. In countries where the taxes on low-income workers are relatively high, such a tax break would also stimulate labour supply and thus growth as argued at the end of Section 3. Although it may not be consistent with a pro-growth long-term tax agenda, it is sometimes argued that cutting consumption taxes is the best way of increasing consumption expenditures. However, this is unlikely to be as effective as income tax cuts for low-income households, because a cut in the main consumption tax rate gives the greatest absolute benefit to those who spend most: those on medium and high incomes, who are likely to save most of any tax cut. There is also the risk that the cut might not be fully passed on in lower prices for consumers. A temporary cut might be most effective in the short-run as it could induce people to purchase durable goods earlier than they had planned, provided they could afford it. Indeed, the Symposium on the Economics of VAT Cuts in the March 2009 edition of Fiscal Studies (with articles by Crossley et al., 2009; Barrell and Weale, 2009; and Blundell, 2009) suggests that it was the temporary nature of the recent VAT reduction in the UK that would have accounted for the bulk of any consumption increase. This suggests that an almost equal temporary increase in consumption could have been achieved, without any budgetary cost, by leaving the rate at 17.5% for a short period and announcing that it would rise to 20% after that.
Nonetheless, some governments will judge that a reduction in VAT (or sales tax) is an appropriate response to the crisis, perhaps as part of an overall package that includes help targeted at low-income households. In such cases, it is important that the reduction should take the form of a cut in the main rate rather than lowering the rate for particular products -such as energy or environmentally-friendly products -which would distort the allocation of resources in the economy and increase both compliance and administrative costs. Experience shows that it is very difficult to remove tax preferences once they have been introduced. For example, most OECD countries have found it politically easier to increase the main rate of VAT than to broaden its base by removing selective lower rates or exemptions.
It might be thought that reducing VAT on environmentally-friendly products would be a good long-run change to the tax system, and so the difficulty in reversing such a change is not a problem, but this is misguided. While such a VAT reduction will give an encouragement for consumers to buy more of such products it gives no such encouragement to businesses, beyond a normal response to meet consumer demand, as the VAT that they pay on inputs is normally refunded to them and so does not affect their profitability. A more cost-effective way of promoting these products -and one that would not add complexity to the VAT system -is to provide direct subsidies to these products. However, even this approach involves the dangers associated with 'picking winners'; the expense and environmental ineffectiveness of the subsidies to biofuels demonstrates the harm that such a policy can produce. The most effective way for the 2011 ] F73 tax system to improve the environment is to apply additional consumption taxes on environmentally harmful products -a policy that automatically gives a market advantage to non-harmful products. The need to avoid selective tax preferences is particularly strong in the case of housing. As house price falls have been a major symptom of the crisis in several countries, there is a temptation to provide special tax measures to limit (or even reverse) the fall. However, the long-term consequences of yielding to such temptation could be serious for several reasons. First, in many countries, the inflated house prices before the crisis have contributed to the seriousness of the current economic situation. Part of this house price inflation is probably due to the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing (for example, exemption from capital gains tax), and so further tax concessions will simply create larger problems in the future. Second, most countries have found it particularly difficult to remove tax preferences for housing, and so any 'temporary' tax relief in this area is particularly likely to become permanent. Third, as discussed above, taxation of immovable property is the least harmful tax for economic growth. In fact, well-designed taxes on immovable property can even increase growth by reallocating capital away from tax-subsidised housing towards un-subsidised business activities that are more productive.
The only way that temporary tax concessions on housing could be beneficial would be a reduction in taxes on housing transactions that is linked to a future increase in recurrent taxes on housing. However, such a policy requires considerable political commitment as recurrent taxes on housing are generally unpopular.
In summary, the best tax cut for increasing demand and promoting long-run growth appears to be a reduction in personal income taxes and social security contributions on low-income households. This would be particularly effective in countries where the cut can increase monthly incomes immediately, rather than waiting for a tax assessment at the end of the year.
Inequality
Any tax policy proposal needs to take account of its effects on income distribution and it is particularly important to take account of effects on the welfare of poorer groups during an economic recession, since this group tends to be the most adversely affected. One important consideration here is that the short-run increase in expenditures is designed to reduce unemployment and, to the extent that is successful, it will benefit the poorer groups that always suffer disproportionately from cyclical increases in unemployment. Nonetheless, the policy can be made even more attractive from a distributional point of view if the tax changes themselves directly benefit those on lower incomes.
Another consideration is that people's welfare depends on both leisure and the consumption of goods and services. These are not the same as GDP, and there are two important implications of the differences. First, an increase in expenditures will do more for people's welfare, at least in the short-run, if it is composed predominantly of consumption rather than investment. Second, providing incentives for additional hours of work does not usually have as large an effect on welfare as a reduction in tax liability (or increase in benefit entitlement) that has the same effect on measured
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[ F E B R U A R Y household income. Note that this argument applies only to an increase in hours for people who are already in work; the creation of jobs for the unemployed can usually be viewed as having additional welfare benefits on top of the increase in consumption it makes possible. For the poorest people in society, tax cuts are unlikely to be much help as they are not paying much tax in the first place. Apart from the benefits of increased employment opportunities, these people are best helped most effectively by social benefits (or payable tax credits).
Nonetheless, personal income tax cuts that are targeted at those on modest incomes can improve the living standards of these families, both by directly increasing their disposable income and by giving them a greater incentive to work. In this context, the suggestion (above) to cut personal income tax and social security contributions for lowincome families becomes even more attractive. It will stimulate demand, improve welfare of poorer families and increase labour force participation.
None of the other tax cut options discussed above would particularly benefit the poor: corporate tax reductions benefit shareholders, consumers and workers to varying degrees but are unlikely to particularly benefit those on low incomes. They are also aimed at increasing investment rather than consumption; cutting high rates of personal income taxes or property taxes are likely to help the better off; while cuts in sales taxes apply across the population but give greater absolute gains to those who can afford to spend most. 
After Recovery
As economies emerge from recession, it is likely to be necessary to raise additional revenues. It will not be sufficient to restore them to pre-crisis levels unless permanent cuts in expenditure are planned, because there will have been an increase in government debt -arising from the reduced taxes and increased social benefits during the crisis and from possible increased government spending on infrastructure projects, bank recapitalisations and other crisis measures -that will need to be serviced and repaid.
This means that it will not be sufficient to simply reverse the earlier tax reductions, unless tax reforms have substantially increased GDP per head. In addition, it might well be a good opportunity to change the structure of the tax system to promote economic growth. Thus, the tax increases after the crisis should focus on taxes that have been shown to be least harmful to growth: particularly recurrent taxes on immovable property and general consumption taxes.
Countries vary widely in their use of recurrent taxes on immovable property (OECD, 2009). So, while it is unlikely that those countries with already high levels of such taxes will want to increase them, there is considerable scope for raising them in the other countries. However, this will require careful planning as such taxes usually belong to sub-national governments (although an increase in their revenues could be an advantage as many sub-national governments have been very adversely affected by the crisis) and there would need to be a simultaneous adjustment to the grants that central governments provide to sub-national levels. Moreover, these taxes are often unpopular and perceived as regressive, and the required proportional increases in the taxes would be large. Nonetheless, increases could be introduced gradually and regressivity avoided by regular re-valuations and provisions for people who would have difficulty paying the tax from current income.
Increases in general consumption taxes are more likely to generate revenues on the scale required. However, many European countries already have high VAT rates and it might be unwise to raise their standard rates further. Nevertheless, many countries make considerable use of exemptions and lower rates (including zero) of VAT (OECD, 2008) . Substantial revenues could potentially be obtained by gradually removing many of these provisions. Some of these VAT reductions are designed to reduce the apparent regressivity of the tax, but they are poorly targeted because rich people spend more than poor people on the goods ⁄ these goods. From a distributional -as well as efficiency -point of view, it is better to have a uniform VAT on a broad base and use some of the additional revenues to assist low-income households, which would still leave a substantial revenue gain to the government (Larre and Heady, 2007) .
Conclusions
This article has presented empirical results that support theoretical beliefs that economic growth can be increased by gradually moving the tax base towards consumption and immovable property (especially residential property). It has also argued that growth can also be enhanced by improving the design of individual taxes.
In some cases, such as the reduction of corporate taxes and the top rate of personal income tax, it is unlikely that these growth-enhancing changes will help the recovery from the current crisis. At the same time, there are tax changes that appear to be bad for growth, such as reductions in sales taxes (particularly if they take the form of exemptions and reductions) and property taxes that would do little to speed recovery.
The tax change that shows the most promise in terms of both increased growth and economic recovery is the reduction of income taxes (including social security contributions) of those on low incomes. This would stimulate demand, increase work incentives and reduce income inequality.
Finally, the article has argued that any necessary increases in revenue after recovery would be least harmful to growth if they were based on increasing recurrent taxes on immovable property and consumption taxes (especially if this took the form of reducing exemptions and rate reductions).
such an aggregate production is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type, where production at time t is given by:
Y ðtÞ ¼ K ðtÞ a H ðtÞ b ½AðtÞLðtÞ 1ÀaÀb ; ðA:1Þ
In (A.1) Y, K, H and L are respectively output, physical capital, human capital and labour, a is the partial elasticity of output with respect to physical capital, b is the partial elasticity of output with respect to human capital and A(t) is the level of technological and economic efficiency, which for simplicity is assumed to be labour augmenting. 20 The interpretation of the level of economic and technological efficiency A(t) is that it can be decomposed into two elements: economic efficiency I(t) which can be influenced by institutions and public policies and the level of 'exogenous' pure technological progress W(t); see Cellini (1997) for a similar formulation. This means that I(t) can be written as a function of institutional and policy variables, which will be denoted by the vector v(t), while W(t) is merely a function of time. Equation (A.1) can easily be converted into an expression for the steady-state output in intensive form, where GDP per head of the working age population is a function of the investment rate, per capita human capital stocks proxied by the average years of education of the working age population and the growth rate of the working age population. 21 If economies were constantly in their steady state, or if one could be satisfied with approximating steady state growth by sufficiently long time averages, such an expression could be directly amenable to the data. When using annual data, however, such an assumption would be unreasonable.
The main data source used is the OECD Annual National Accounts data base for output and factor inputs, as well as the OECD Revenue Statistics for information on taxes. The sample includes 21 OECD countries over the period 1971-2004. 22 Given the limited country coverage of only 21 countries, it is desirable to use the maximum degree of information contained in the data. Long time averages over many years or decades, as used in some of the early studies, imply a significant loss of information, and make it difficult to account for unobserved country heterogeneity, which can be a significant concern.
For this reason, an attractive alternative option is to use annual data in a fixed effects panel framework and model the transitional dynamics explicitly, rather than accepting the loss of information implied by collapsing the annual data to averages. This implies the need for an estimation framework that is able to account for off-equilibrium dynamics of GDP per capita. For this reason, the present analysis uses an error correction model (ECM), in which the explanatory variables are included both in levels and in first differences to pick up transitional dynamics, in addition to the lagged dependent variable in levels. Thus, assuming a parsimonious one-year lag structure, the logarithmic growth equation in intensive form can be written as follows:
where y is output per head of the working population, s K is the investment rate, h is the stock of human capital (average years of education), n is the growth rate of the working age population, a 0 are a set of country fixed effects and F(t) is a country-specific function of time. The terms in the second line capture short-term dynamics and e is a white noise error term. Equation (A.2) 20 This formulation makes it conceptually easier to decompose growth into the effects of labour utilisation, labour productivity and capital deepening.
21 Arnold et al. (2007) deal in more detail with the formal derivation, and the fact that information on human capital is available only as a stock measure, and how this can be properly accounted for in the equation. The human capital variable is taken from that article. 22 The country sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, West Germany (until 1990), Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and the US. The chosen countries are those with continuous annual series for the variables used in the growth equations over most of the 1971-2004 period (with the exception of Germany).
represents the basic functional form that has been estimated in this article, where it is presented in ECM form in Section 1. The equation has also been estimated with different lag structures, but in general, this was not found to make much of a difference.
Estimates of steady state coefficients as well as of the parameters of the production function can be retrieved on the basis of the estimated coefficients of this equation. For instance, an estimate of the elasticity of steady state output to the investment rate (that is the long-run effect of the investment rate on output) is given by the estimated values of a 1 ⁄ u. Similarly, a semielasticity for the tax variables contained in the vector v can be calculated as a j ⁄ u. The regression Table presented in Section 1 contains the steady state effects calculated in this way. Equation (A.2) can be estimated in different ways. One possible approach would be to assume that the country fixed effects pick up all relevant heterogeneity across countries, and restrict all remaining parameters to be equal across the sample. However, it is well known that OECD economies display different degrees of flexibility. Duval et al. (2007) have documented significant differences across OECD countries with respect to their ability to maintain output close to potential in the aftermath of shocks, which suggests that one should not expect the same adjustment process towards the equilibrium output path across countries. With respect to the long run relationships, however, heterogeneity may be less of a concern. In fact it is quite conceivable that the long-run relationship between tax structures and growth would follow the same economic principles in all countries, even if countries differ in their behaviour around the equilibrium path. Similarly, in the context of highly integrated OECD economies with access to the same technologies, it is unlikely to expect differences in the long run production function parameters. Hence, assuming that all slope coefficients are entirely unrelated across countries may represent an unwanted loss of efficiency.
Our choice of estimator therefore fell on an intermediate solution, the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator suggested by Pesaran et al. (1999) which allows testing for homogeneity on a variable-by-variable basis using Hausman tests (Hausman, 1978) . These tests suggested the need for country-specific convergence paths to the steady state, but could not reject homogeneity for the long-run production function coefficients and the long-run relationships between taxes and growth. As a result, intercepts, the convergence parameter (/), short-run coefficients (b s ) and error variances are allowed to differ across countries.
Finally, in order to allow for unobserved and non-constant country idiosyncrasies, all regressions include country-specific time controls, and both a linear trend and a non-linear specification using indicator variables for five-year periods have been tried. Non-linear time controls are motivated by the fact that many OECD countries have been affected over the past decades by nonlinear patterns of productivity growth, with a slow-down in productivity growth over the late 1970s and 1980s period followed -in some of them -by an acceleration in productivity growth in the 1990s and early 2000s. The nonlinear time controls turned out to be the most stable specification, and were retained for the subsequent analysis.
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